Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse Packet
This packet is intended for use in an introductory mechanical engineering course.
An overview of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkway collapse is presented,
and construction safety issues are emphasized. A homework assignment is included,
as are sample exam problems.
Time for presentation is estimated as 30 minutes.
Objectives:
1. To introduce mechanical engineering students to concerns present in engineering.
2. To increase awareness of construction safety.
This packet includes the following items:
Download the Kansas
City Module in printable Adobe Acrobat Format
(pdf). This includes overheads in a ready to use format.
Homework problem solutions, exam problems, and exam solutions are available
to qualified recipients. Send an email with request information to Dr.
Donald Bloswick.
Kansas
City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse Lecture Outline
- An Engineer's Responsibility (OVERHEAD
1)
- Engineers have a tremendous responsibility
to insure the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
- The public well-being can be maintained only
if engineers follow all codes and standards, and uphold their professional
obligations.
- Safety during the construction phase of projects
will help to insure the ultimate safety of the completed structure.
- The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
is an incident where construction safety was compromised, leading to the
eventual collapse of the walkway.
- Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
(OVERHEAD 2)
- On July 17, 1981, the Hyatt Regency Hotel
in Kansas City, Missouri held a videotaped tea-dance party in their atrium
lobby. The hotel had only been open for approximately one year.
- Many people were standing and dancing on
the suspended walkways.
- The connections supporting the ceiling
rods that held up the second and fourth-floor walkways across the atrium
failed, and both walkways collapsed onto the crowded first-floor atrium
below.
- The fourth-floor walkway collapsed onto
the second-floor walkway, while the offset third-floor walkway remained
intact.
- 114 people were killed, and over 200 injured.
Millions of dollars in costs resulted from the collapse.
- Basic Walkway Design (OVERHEAD 3)
- Three walkways, on the second, third, and
fourth floors, span the atrium.
- The third floor walkway was designed for
higher traffic than the other walkways, and was consequently wider and
offset from the other walkways.
- The third and fourth floor walkways were
suspended from the atrium roof, with the second floor walkway connected
to the fourth floor walkway.
- A Collapse During Construction (OVERHEAD
4)
- A collapse occurred on October 14, 1979
while the hotel was under construction.
- Over 2700 square feet of the atrium roof
collapsed because a roof connection failed.
- After this collapse, the engineering firm
in charge promised to review all steel connections and requested on-site
representation during construction.
- The owner rejected the request, due to
the additional cost involved.
- While the hotel was under construction, changes
were made in the design of the hanger rod connections.
- The fabricator changed the design from
a one-rod to a two-rod system to simplify the assembly task, doubling
the load on the connector, which ultimately resulted in the walkway collapse.
(OVERHEADS 5, 6. Discuss as desired.)
- (OVERHEAD 7) The fabricator
did not want to have to thread the entire rod in order to install the
washer and the nut. The revised design consisted of:
- The top ends of the third and fourth
floor support rods were attached to the atrium roof.
- The bottom ends went through the box
beam where a washer and nut were threaded on.
- A second rod was attached to the box
beam four inches from the first rod.
- The second floor walkway was suspended
from the fourth floor walkway in a similar fashion.
- (OVERHEAD 8) The fabricator,
while in sworn testimony, claimed that his company had telephoned the
engineering firm for change approval. The engineering firm declared they
had not received the phone call.
- Even as originally designed, the walkways
were barely capable of holding up the expected load, and would have failed
to meet Kansas City building requirements.
- The Kansas City Building Code requires
a minimum support value of 151 kN. The original design was capable of
supporting 90 kN. With the design changes made during construction, the
walkways would be supporting double that amount, or 180 kN, assuming the
walkways were loaded at the maximum recommended weight limit.
- Who was responsible? (OVERHEAD 9)
- A lack of communication between the designer
and the fabricator is one of the contributors to the failure of the walkways.
- The engineering firm did receive revised
drawings during construction and stamped them with their engineering review
seal, authorizing construction.
- The revised design was significantly less
capable of holding up the required forces, and was not designed in accordance
with the Kansas City building code.
- Consequences (OVERHEAD 10)
- 114 people were killed and over 200 injured.
- Many principals involved lost engineering
licenses.
- Engineers were found guilty of gross negligence,
misconduct, and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering.
- Expensive legal suits were settled out
of court.
- Several firms involved went bankrupt.
- Conclusion (OVERHEAD 11)
- From the Kansas City example, the importance
of an engineer's responsibility can be seen in aspects ranging from design
to construction.
- The collapse of the atrium roof during construction
was indicative of problems with the overall design.
- Engineers should thoroughly review all designs
and modifications made during the construction phase to insure the safety
of the project.
Adapted from: http://www.eos.uoguelph.ca/webfiles/james/homepage/Teaching/210/WebShare/WWWROOT/Home/Background_/background_.htm
http://lowery.tamu.edu/ethics/ethics/hyatt/hyatt1.htm
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~jtt3e/hyatt/paper.htm
http://www.sgh.com/kchyatt.htm
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~ajenney/webpage.htm
Overhead
1
An Engineer's Responsibility
- Engineers have a tremendous responsibility
to insure the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
- The public well-being can be maintained only
if engineers follow all codes and standards, and uphold their professional
obligations.
- Safety during the construction phase of projects
will help to insure the ultimate safety of the completed structure.
- The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
is an incident where construction safety was compromised, leading to the eventual
collapse of the walkway.
Overhead 2
Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
On July 17, 1981, the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas
City, Missouri held a videotaped tea-dance party in their atrium lobby. The hotel
had only been open for approximately one year.
- •Many people were standing and dancing on
the suspended walkways.
- •The connections supporting the ceiling rods
that held up the second and fourth-floor walkways across the atrium failed,
and both walkways collapsed onto the crowded first-floor atrium below.
- •The fourth-floor walkway collapsed onto
the second-floor walkway, while the offset third-floor walkway remained
intact.
- •114 people were killed, and over 200 injured.
Millions of dollars in costs resulted from the collapse.
Overhead 3
Basic Walkway Design
- Three walkways, on the second, third, and
fourth floors, span the atrium.
- The third floor walkway was designed for
higher traffic than the other walkways, and was consequently wider and
offset from the other walkways.
- The third and fourth floor walkways were
suspended from the atrium roof, with the second floor walkway connected
to the fourth floor walkway.
Overhead 4
A Collapse During Construction
- •A collapse occurred on October 14, 1979 while the hotel was under construction.
- •Over 2700 square feet of the atrium roof
collapsed because a roof connection failed.
- •After this collapse, the engineering firm
in charge promised to review all steel connections and requested on-site
representation during construction.
- •The owner rejected the request, due to the
additional cost involved.
Overhead 5
Original Design
Connector supports the weight of one walkway
Taken from http://www.uoguelph.ca/~ajenney/webpage.htm
Overhead 6
Design, as built
Connector supports the weight of two walkways
Taken from http://www.uoguelph.ca/~ajenney/webpage.htm
Overhead 7
The fabricator did not want to have
to thread the entire rod in order to install the washer and the nut. The revised
design consisted of:
- The top ends of the third and fourth floor
support rods were attached to the atrium roof.
- The bottom ends went through the box beam
where a washer and nut were threaded on.
- A second rod was attached to the box beam
four inches from the first rod.
- The second floor walkway was suspended
from the fourth floor walkway in a similar fashion.
Overhead 8
- The fabricator, while in sworn testimony, claimed
that his company had telephoned the engineering firm for change approval.
The engineering firm declared they had not received the phone call.
- Even as originally designed, the walkways were
barely capable of holding up the expected load, and would have failed to meet
Kansas City building requirements.
- The Kansas City Building Code requires a minimum
support value of 151 kN. The original design was capable of supporting 90
kN. With the design changes made during construction, the walkways would be
supporting double that amount, or 180 kN, assuming the walkways were loaded
at the maximum recommended weight limit.
Overhead 9
Who was responsible?
- •A lack of communication between the designer
and the fabricator is one of the contributors to the failure of the walkways.
- •The engineering firm did receive revised
drawings during construction and stamped them with their engineering review
seal, authorizing construction.
- •The revised design was significantly less
capable of holding up the required forces, and was not designed in accordance
with the Kansas City building code.
Overhead 10
Consequences
- •114 people were killed and over 200 injured.
- •Many principals involved lost engineering
licenses.
- •Engineers were found guilty of gross negligence,
misconduct, and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering.
- •Expensive legal suits were settled out of
court.
- •Several firms involved went bankrupt.
Overhead 11
Conclusion
- •From the Kansas City example, the importance
of an engineer's responsibility can be seen in aspects ranging from design
to construction.
- •The collapse of the atrium roof during construction
was indicative of problems with the overall design.
- •Engineers should thoroughly review all designs
and modifications made during the construction phase to insure the safety
of the project.
Kansas
City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse Lecture Handout
I. An Engineer's Responsibility
A. Engineers have a tremendous responsibility to insure the safety, health,
and welfare of the public. B. The public
well-being can be maintained only if engineers follow all codes and standards,
and uphold their professional obligations.
C. Safety during the construction phase of projects will help to insure the
ultimate safety of the completed structure.
- The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
is an incident where construction safety was compromised, leading to the
eventual collapse of the walkway.
- Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
- On July 17, 1981, the Hyatt Regency Hotel
in Kansas City, Missouri held a videotaped tea-dance party in their atrium
lobby. The hotel had only been open for approximately one year.
- Many people were standing and dancing on
the suspended walkways.
- The connections supporting the ceiling
rods that held up the second and fourth-floor walkways across the atrium
failed, and both walkways collapsed onto the crowded first-floor atrium
below.
- The fourth-floor walkway collapsed onto
the second-floor walkway, while the offset third-floor walkway remained
intact.
- 114 people were killed, and over 200 injured.
Millions of dollars in costs resulted from the collapse.
- Basic Walkway Design
- Three walkways, on the second, third, and
fourth floors, span the atrium.
- The third floor walkway was designed for
higher traffic than the other walkways, and was consequently wider and
offset from the other walkways.
- The third and fourth floor walkways were
suspended from the atrium roof, with the second floor walkway connected
to the fourth floor walkway.
- A Collapse During Construction
- A collapse occurred on October 14, 1979
while the hotel was under construction.
- Over 2700 square feet of the atrium roof
collapsed because a roof connection failed.
- After this collapse, the engineering firm
in charge promised to review all steel connections and requested on-site
representation during construction.
- The owner rejected the request, due to
the additional cost involved.
- While the hotel was under construction, changes
were made in the design of the hanger rod connections.
- The fabricator changed the design from
a one-rod to a two-rod system to simplify the assembly task, doubling
the load on the connector, which ultimately resulted in the walkway collapse.
- The fabricator did not want to have to
thread the entire rod in order to install the washer and the nut. The
revised design consisted of:
- The top ends of the third and fourth
floor support rods were attached to the atrium roof.
- The bottom ends went through the box
beam where a washer and nut were threaded on.
- A second rod was attached to the box
beam four inches from the first rod.
- The second floor walkway was suspended
from the fourth floor walkway in a similar fashion.
- The fabricator, while in sworn testimony,
claimed that his company had telephoned the engineering firm for change
approval. The engineering firm declared they had not received the phone
call.
- Even as originally designed, the walkways
were barely capable of holding up the expected load, and would have failed
to meet Kansas City building requirements.
- The Kansas City Building Code requires
a minimum support value of 151 kN. The original design was capable of
supporting 90 kN. With the design changes made during construction, the
walkways would be supporting double that amount, or 180 kN, assuming the
walkways were loaded at the maximum recommended weight limit.
- Who was responsible?
- A lack of communication between the designer
and the fabricator is one of the contributors to the failure of the walkways.
- The engineering firm did receive revised
drawings during construction and stamped them with their engineering review
seal, authorizing construction.
- The revised design was significantly less
capable of holding up the required forces, and was not designed in accordance
with the Kansas City building code.
- Consequences
- 114 people were killed and over 200 injured.
- Many principals involved lost engineering
licenses.
- Engineers were found guilty of gross negligence,
misconduct, and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering.
- Expensive legal suits were settled out
of court.
- Several firms involved went bankrupt.
- Conclusion
- From the Kansas City example, the importance
of an engineer's responsibility can be seen in aspects ranging from design
to construction.
- The collapse of the atrium roof during construction
was indicative of problems with the overall design.
- Engineers should thoroughly review all designs
and modifications made during the construction phase to insure the safety
of the project.
Adapted from:
http://www.eos.uoguelph.ca/webfiles/james/homepage/Teaching/210/WebShare/WWWROOT/Home/Background_/background_.htm
http://lowery.tamu.edu/ethics/ethics/hyatt/hyatt1.htm
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~jtt3e/hyatt/paper.htm
http://www.sgh.com/kchyatt.htm
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~ajenney/webpage.htm
Kansas
City Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse Homework Assignment
Write a one page paper discussing the following:
1. What was the loading problem in the walkway collapse?
2. Why should the problem have been detected?
3. What design issues were partial causes of the collapse?